Lakeside Towers has returned to the collective-sale market with a S$350 million reserve price, marking its third major attempt after unsuccessful exercises in 2018 and 2023. The 144-unit development occupies a 153,237 sq ft site at 9G and 9H Yuan Ching Road, with approximately 190 metres of frontage along Jurong Lake Gardens. Its existing gross floor area has been verified at a plot ratio of about 2.36, higher than the site’s base Master Plan plot ratio of 2.1, and JLL estimates that the site could be redeveloped into approximately 395 apartments. The tender closes on 1 October 2026.
Our assessment is that Lakeside Towers has a materially better chance of securing a buyer than it did in 2018, and a moderately better chance than in 2023. This does not mean that a sale at exactly S$350 million is assured. The owners have largely solved the internal-consent problem, the replacement-housing problem has eased, financing conditions are substantially less hostile, and nearby new launches have established selling prices above S$2,000 psf. However, developers must still justify paying an effective land rate of about S$1,225 psf per plot ratio, about 8.2% above the S$1,132 psf ppr paid for the better-connected Lucerne Grand site.
The crucial distinction is that Lakeside Towers is now much more en-bloc-ready on the owners’ side, while its remaining uncertainty lies almost entirely on the developer-feasibility side.
What is different about the third attempt
The reserve price of S$350 million is not higher than the 2023 attempt, but it is 14.8% above the S$305 million sought in 2018. In 2018, the estimated all-in land rate was about S$1,125 psf ppr after an estimated S$57 million in differential and lease-upgrading premiums. Today, the effective rate is approximately S$1,277 psf ppr based on the verified 2.36 plot ratio, or S$1,225 psf ppr when balcony bonus floor area and the relevant estimated charges are incorporated.
Importantly, S$1,225 psf ppr is not the asking price of the apartments. The asking price is S$350 million for the entire estate. S$1,225 psf ppr is the estimated effective land cost to a developer after taking account of the redevelopment floor area, lease top-up and planning-related charges.
| Factor | First attempt | Second attempt | Current attempt |
| Launch period | 2018 | 2023 | 2026 |
| Reserve price | S$305 million | S$350 million | S$350 million |
| Indicative effective land rate | About S$1,125 psf ppr | About S$1,198 psf ppr with bonus GFA | About S$1,225 psf ppr with bonus GFA |
| Remaining lease | About 56 years | About 51 years | About 48 years |
| Nearby redevelopment evidence | Limited | Neighbouring sites had sold, but replacement projects were not yet proven | LakeGarden Residences, Sora and J’Den have supplied actual sales evidence |
| Financing environment | Initially buoyant, followed by abrupt policy and HSR shocks | High interest rates and sharply elevated construction costs | Significantly lower SORA, although construction costs remain elevated |
| Owner motivation | Less urgent lease-decay pressure | Growing motivation | Strong motivation, substantial retiree ownership and more convenient HDB right-sizing |
| Main obstacle | Sudden loss of Jurong/HSR sentiment and marginal feasibility | Gap between owners’ price and developer economics | Premium over Lucerne Grand’s GLS land rate |
The increase from S$305 million to S$350 million should therefore not be interpreted as owners simply becoming more ambitious. New-home selling prices have risen much more sharply than the reserve price since 2018. In early 2018, many OCR projects were transacting at approximately S$1,280 to S$1,530 psf, while the overall average for new private homes was around S$1,500 psf. In January 2026, the median price of new 99-year leasehold, non-landed OCR homes was already S$2,164 psf.
In other words, the effective Lakeside Towers land rate has increased by roughly 9% from the 2018 figure, while achievable suburban new-launch prices have increased by considerably more. That widening revenue envelope is one of the strongest reasons the third attempt is more credible.
Why the earlier attempts did not succeed
The first attempt collided with a Jurong-specific shock
Lakeside Towers was launched in 2018 at S$305 million, translating to an estimated S$1,125 psf ppr after lease-upgrading and intensification premiums. At that point, developers could potentially construct approximately 250 to 350 apartments, depending on average unit sizes. The tender closed on 28 May 2018 without a successful bid.
The timing was exceptionally unfortunate. On the same day that the Lakeside Towers tender closed, Malaysia’s then-new government announced its intention to abandon the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore High-Speed Rail project. The proposed Singapore terminus in Jurong East had been a major part of the investment narrative surrounding Jurong property, and market observers warned that cancelling the railway could slow anticipated business and property-price growth in the district.
It cannot be proven that the HSR news alone caused the failed tender. However, it is reasonable to infer that the loss of a high-profile regional transport catalyst made developers less willing to underwrite aggressive future selling prices in Jurong at precisely the wrong moment. The S$1,125 psf ppr land rate also left limited room when contemporary OCR projects were generally selling in the S$1,300-to-S$1,500 psf range.
The July 2018 cooling measures came after the formal Lakeside Towers tender had closed, so they were not the original cause of the failed tender. Nevertheless, they substantially reduced the possibility of a quick revival or post-tender transaction. From 6 July 2018, developers faced higher ABSD and a new 5% non-remittable component, while tighter loan-to-value limits were expected to weaken end-buyer demand. Analysts consequently anticipated a sharp slowdown in collective-sale activity during the second half of 2018.
The first attempt therefore suffered from a combination of thin development margins, sudden HSR uncertainty and an impending collapse in the wider en bloc cycle.
The second attempt attracted interest but failed on price
The circumstances in 2023 initially appeared much more encouraging. In 2022, neighbouring Lakeside Apartments had been sold to Wing Tai for S$273.88 million, equivalent to approximately S$1,250 to S$1,260 psf ppr. Park View Mansions was subsequently acquired for S$260 million, or about S$1,023 psf ppr. These two transactions appeared to establish developer appetite for lakefront redevelopment sites along Yuan Ching Road.
Lakeside Towers was therefore launched at S$350 million in early 2023. That price translated to approximately S$1,244 psf ppr using its existing verified floor area, or about S$1,198 psf ppr after incorporating the then-applicable 10% bonus GFA assumptions. The first tender attracted several expressions of interest and one formal offer, but the best offer was below the S$350 million reserve. The estate was relaunched on 30 June 2023 at the same price, and the second tender also failed.
This is an important distinction: the 2023 attempt did not fail because no developer saw value in the site. It failed because the price that at least one developer was prepared to pay did not meet the owners’ minimum.
By 2023, developers were dealing with conditions that had deteriorated markedly from the 2022 en bloc deals. Interest rates had risen sharply; three-month compounded SORA was around 3.75% in June 2023. Construction costs had increased dramatically after the pandemic, while the developer ABSD regime required a 5% non-remittable payment and a substantial remittable component dependent on completing and selling the project within the prescribed period.
URA’s floor-area harmonisation rules also took effect in June 2023. JLL estimated that the harmonised definitions could reduce developers’ saleable area by approximately 4% to 5%, directly reducing revenue potential while construction and financing costs remained elevated.
Furthermore, the Government’s original 6.5-hectare Jurong Lake District master-developer site was eventually not awarded, reinforcing the impression that large-scale developers were unwilling to take substantial Jurong exposure at the prevailing prices and risk levels. The Government subsequently divided the area into smaller parcels, including the Town Hall Link white site launched in 2026.
The second attempt consequently failed because seller expectations were anchored to the successful 2022 neighbouring en blocs, while developer calculations were already reflecting 2023 interest rates, construction costs, ABSD risk and reduced saleable efficiency.
Why the owners are better aligned this time
One of the strongest features of the current exercise is that more than 80% of owners have already consented to the S$350 million collective sale. The internal threshold required under the existing regime has therefore been achieved before the tender launch.
There has also been extremely little recent resale activity. Public transaction records show only two sales in the past three years, both involving approximately 1,970 sq ft units in 2024: one at S$1.60 million, or S$812 psf, and another at S$1.58 million, or S$802 psf. No later resale transaction is recorded in the attached PropNex Investment Suite data.
This matters because an estate that has seen many recent purchases can encounter resistance from owners who paid contemporary market prices, incurred stamp duties and renovation expenses, and would receive only a limited premium after transaction costs. Lakeside Towers does not appear to face that degree of recent-entry fragmentation.
A simple division of the S$350 million reserve price by 144 units produces an estate-wide arithmetic average of approximately S$2.43 million per unit before collective-sale expenses. Actual proceeds will not be divided equally; they will depend on the approved method of apportionment, strata area, share value and other provisions in the collective sale agreement. Nevertheless, compared with the two latest resale prices of S$1.58 million and S$1.60 million, the reserve implies the potential for a substantial gross uplift at the estate level.
The indication that only two owners bought recently does not, by itself, prove that every other owner has a low acquisition cost. However, the limited transaction turnover, the building’s age and the reported owner profile strongly suggest that many units have been held for long periods. Based on the holding period, age of the project, and the high percentage of Singaporean ownership, it is safe to assume that most owners are retirees who intend to move to an HDB or smaller flat and retain the remaining proceeds for retirement.
The lease position adds urgency. Lakeside Towers was completed in 1981, but its 99-year lease commenced in 1975. It therefore has approximately 48 years remaining. As that figure falls further, the pool of potential resale buyers can narrow because CPF usage and maximum loan tenure are tied to the buyer’s age and the remaining lease, while buyers also become more conscious that the property will eventually revert to the State without compensation at lease expiry. The current collective sale offers owners an opportunity to crystallise the underlying redevelopment value before lease decay becomes even more dominant.
The situation is therefore unusually aligned: older owners have an increasingly depreciating asset, there are very few recent buyers needing to recover high entry costs, and the collective-sale premium could finance right-sizing and retirement.
The relaxation measures and their actual impact
Recent policy announcements have created a more favourable narrative for collective sales, but it is important not to overstate their direct impact on Lakeside Towers.
Lower consent thresholds are proposed, not yet operational
On 4 August 2026, the Ministry of Law introduced the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill for First Reading. The Bill proposes reducing the consent threshold to 70% for developments aged 40 to 59 years and 65% for developments aged 60 years or more. Developments aged 10 to 39 years would remain subject to an 80% threshold, while those below ten years would continue to require 90%.
The same Bill proposes stronger procedural safeguards, including requiring at least 35% of owners to requisition a meeting to form a collective sale committee, shortening the CSA signature-collection period from 12 months to six months, and extending the heightened-restriction period after a failed attempt from two to three years. The commencement date has not yet been announced.
Lakeside Towers, at 45 years old, would fall into the proposed 70% category. However, the estate has already secured more than 80% consent, and JLL has stated that it will not benefit directly from the lower threshold in the current attempt. The reform is therefore a positive policy signal, not a missing legal ingredient that suddenly makes this tender possible.
The developer ABSD extension does not apply to this 395-unit project
From 29 July 2026, the Government extended ABSD remission timelines for large-scale en bloc redevelopments. Sites yielding 700 to 1,399 units can receive six years to complete and sell the project, while sites producing 1,400 units or more can receive seven years, subject to an intermediate sales condition for mega developments. Regular sites yielding between five and 699 homes retain the existing five-year completion-and-sale timeline.
Since Lakeside Towers is expected to yield only about 395 apartments, it is classified as a regular en bloc site. The new six- and seven-year concessions do not directly reduce the buyer’s ABSD deadline risk.
The announcement may encourage more developers to reassess the collective-sale market generally, and it confirms that the Government wants to facilitate the renewal of ageing estates. But a bidder for Lakeside Towers must still assume that all approximately 395 units need to be completed and sold within the normal five-year ABSD remission period.
The HDB wait-out relaxation is directly relevant to owners
A separate July 2026 change may be more meaningful to Lakeside Towers’ residents. The Government removed the 15-month wait-out period for private property owners and former private property owners purchasing a non-subsidised HDB resale flat without an HDB housing loan. They may now purchase such a flat without waiting 15 months, although an existing private property must generally be disposed of within six months of completing the HDB purchase.
The 30-month wait remains for purchasers seeking subsidised flats, housing grants, an HDB loan or an executive condominium. The relaxation is therefore not universal, but it substantially improves flexibility for cash-rich private-property retirees who intend to right-size into a resale HDB flat.
That description aligns with our assumptions regarding a significant segment of Lakeside Towers’ owner base. In particular, our assumption that a high proportion of owners are Singapore retirees may help explain why owner motivation appears stronger and more cohesive than in the earlier exercises.
Why the developer case is stronger in 2026
New-launch prices now support a higher land value
The clearest improvement is the evidence provided by projects already selling in and around Jurong.
The former Lakeside Apartments site has become the 306-unit LakeGarden Residences. As of August 2026, approximately 99% of the project had been sold at an average price of about S$2,160 psf. The former Park View Mansions site has become the 440-unit Sora, which was approximately 51% sold at an average of about S$2,237 psf. J’Den, on the former JCube site, was approximately 97% sold at an average of about S$2,475 psf.
These are not merely agents’ forecasts. They are observable sales outcomes from projects in the Jurong market.
The broader OCR figures tell the same story. PropNex reported a median of S$2,164 psf for new 99-year leasehold, non-landed OCR homes sold in January 2026. Another transaction-based assessment put the rolling 12-month OCR new-sale average at about S$2,136 psf in late 2025.
Lakeside Towers possesses a feature that is difficult to replicate through ordinary GLS supply: an extensive frontage overlooking Jurong Lake Gardens. The 90-hectare gardens are Singapore’s first national gardens in the heartlands, and the rejuvenated Chinese and Japanese Gardens reopened in September 2024. The completion of these works turns what was partly a future planning proposition in 2018 and 2023 into a functioning amenity that buyers can visit and evaluate today.
Financing conditions are far less punitive than in 2023
Three-month compounded SORA was about 3.75% in June 2023. By 5 August 2026, it was approximately 1.12%. Although a developer’s financing rate will include credit spreads and project-specific terms, the decline in the benchmark materially lowers interest carry on land acquisition and construction expenditure.
This is especially relevant for an en bloc purchase because the developer incurs costs before generating presale cash flow: acquisition financing, lease top-up, demolition, professional fees, approvals and construction mobilisation. Lower financing rates do not make a marginal development automatically profitable, but they reduce one of the major reasons the 2023 bid fell below reserve.
Construction costs remain a concern. BCA expects construction demand of S$47 billion to S$53 billion in 2026, broadly similar to 2025, suggesting that contractors and skilled resources will remain busy. The cost environment is therefore not returning to pre-pandemic levels. Nevertheless, the acute combination of rapidly rising construction costs and peak financing rates that characterised the 2023 tender is less severe today.
Jurong’s transformation is now more concrete
URA continues to identify Jurong Lake District as Singapore’s largest mixed-use business district outside the city centre. The Master Plan 2025 positions the district as a major western economic hub supported by the Jurong Gateway, Jurong Region Line and Cross Island Line.
Several developments have progressed from broad plans to identifiable projects. The Government launched the Town Hall Link white site in 2026 to advance the next phase of JLD. The new Science Centre is planned beside Chinese Garden MRT station around the end of 2027. The alignment of Cross Island Line Phase Three was announced in July 2026, with construction expected to begin in 2027 and the western stations targeted for the late 2030s.
The Cross Island Line is too distant to justify an aggressive land price on its own. But the combination of completed gardens, active residential redevelopment, the Science Centre, new commercial sites and confirmed rail infrastructure makes the Jurong story less dependent on a single speculative catalyst than it was when the HSR dominated market expectations in 2018.
The Lucerne Grand comparison and final verdict
The strongest objection to Lakeside Towers’ pricing is the nearby Lakeside Drive GLS site acquired by CDL for S$608 million, or S$1,132 psf ppr, in June 2025. The future Lucerne Grand is expected to contain approximately 570 to 575 units, five residential towers and commercial space on the first storey, immediately beside Lakeside MRT station. CDL intends to launch it in the third quarter of 2026.
At S$1,225 psf ppr, Lakeside Towers carries a premium of approximately S$93 psf ppr, or 8.2%, over CDL’s winning Lucerne Grand land rate.
The comparison is even more challenging when the full GLS tender results are considered. CDL’s S$1,132 psf ppr offer was 10.4% higher than the second-highest bid of S$1,025 psf ppr. The third-highest bid was approximately S$985 psf ppr. This indicates that most developers valued the clean, MRT-adjacent Lakeside Drive site below S$1,050 psf ppr in June 2025.
A buyer of Lakeside Towers would be paying more for a location around a ten-minute walk from the MRT, while also taking on demolition, collective-sale execution and lease-renewal complexity. That is the central reason the present tender remains far from certain.
However, the comparison is not completely one-sided.
Lucerne Grand’s estimated 570 to 575 homes create a larger sales programme, whereas Lakeside Towers is expected to yield approximately 395 homes. A smaller development is generally easier to absorb within the standard five-year ABSD period, particularly if the unit mix is calibrated to keep total prices affordable. Lakeside Towers also offers a long, unobstructed garden frontage that Lucerne Grand may not replicate in the same way.
The neighbouring evidence also supports the S$1,225 psf ppr figure. Wing Tai paid approximately S$1,250 to S$1,260 psf ppr for Lakeside Apartments in 2022 and subsequently sold almost all of LakeGarden Residences at about S$2,160 psf. From that perspective, Lakeside Towers’ current land rate is not unprecedented for Yuan Ching Road.
Lucerne Grand’s launch timing may ultimately determine the tender outcome. If Lucerne Grand launches before the 1 October tender close and achieves strong sales near the estimated S$2,400 psf level, it will provide immediate evidence that the Jurong market can support another premium-priced development. If sales are slow or substantial discounts are required, bidders will probably use that result to justify offers below S$350 million.
There are also wider market reasons for caution. URA recorded a 0.1% decline in OCR non-landed prices during the second quarter of 2026 after a 2.2% increase in the first quarter. Approximately 60,600 private residential units, including executive condominiums, are expected to be completed over the coming years, while the 2026 GLS Confirmed List contains 9,320 units—more than 50% above the ten-year annual average.
Our final assessment is therefore:
Lakeside Towers is more likely to generate credible bids in 2026 than in either previous attempt. Owner consent is secured, recent ownership turnover is minimal, lease decay has strengthened motivation, the HDB right-sizing restriction has been relaxed, financing rates are lower, and Jurong new-launch prices have been proven above S$2,000 psf.
A transaction at the full S$350 million reserve is less certain. The S$1,225 psf ppr effective rate is aggressive beside Lucerne Grand’s superior MRT location and S$1,132 psf ppr acquisition cost. The latest developer ABSD timeline extension does not apply to a 395-unit redevelopment, and construction, demolition and lease-top-up costs remain significant.
The most realistic conclusion is that the third attempt has a higher probability of success, but perhaps through negotiation rather than an uncontested above-reserve tender. The 2023 exercise already demonstrated that developers were willing to engage but not at the owners’ price. Since then, market selling prices and financing conditions have moved in Lakeside Towers’ favour. If Lucerne Grand validates the projected S$2,300-to-S$2,400-plus psf market and a bidder places sufficient value on the direct garden frontage and smaller sell-down requirement, S$350 million becomes defensible.
If developers continue to anchor their land values closer to the non-winning Lucerne Grand bids of S$985 to S$1,025 psf ppr, the owners may once again face a decision between preserving the reserve price and accepting a negotiated discount. The third attempt is consequently the strongest so far—but the decisive question is no longer whether the owners want to sell. It is whether one developer believes the lakefront premium is worth paying.
Disclaimer: This article is provided for general information and commentary only and does not constitute investment, financial, legal, tax, valuation, or property advice, nor an offer, recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or otherwise transact in any property.
The information contained in this article has been compiled from publicly available sources and other sources believed to be reliable at the time of publication. While reasonable care has been taken in preparing this article, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the accuracy, completeness or reliability of the information. Figures, calculations, estimates and comparisons are indicative and may be subject to assumptions, revisions or errors.
Any opinions, assessments, projections or statements regarding future events—including potential collective-sale outcomes, developer interest, redevelopment feasibility, property prices, land values and market conditions—represent the author’s analysis as at the date of publication and should not be regarded as guarantees or predictions of future performance. Actual outcomes may differ materially.
References to particular developments, transactions or market data are for illustrative and analytical purposes only. Readers should independently verify relevant information and obtain appropriate professional advice before making any property, investment or financial decision. The author and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this article or any information contained herein.
Article contributed by Jerry Wong.
Jerry Wong is a realtor at Propnex Realty, bringing a rich background in interior and lighting design to his work. He loves exploring diverse spaces and observing the transformative power of real estate. Beyond his professional role, Jerry finds his greatest fulfillment in connecting people with the right properties, gaining immense satisfaction from helping clients achieve their dreams.
